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ENFORCING INSIDER TRADING LAW:  
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE  
 
Viviane Muller Prado* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading is a source of many controversies. Some authors 
argue that the market would be more efficient if trading based on insider 
information was allowed.1 On the other hand, empirical studies suggest that 
the consequences of effectively banning insider trading are lower capital 
costs, higher liquidity, and investor protection.2  
This Article starts with the assumption that insider trading rules are 
important for markets. But to have positive results, it is not enough that a 
particular legal system sets a rule banning trading on material, nonpublic 
information. Studies suggest that to be effective in deterring illegal trading 
the rules must be clear and comprehensive, sanctions significant,3 and 
enforcement effective.4  
 
 * The author is grateful for comments and suggestions in various stages of the 
development of this article to David Trubek, Zohar Goshen, Merritt Fox, Marco 
Ventoruzzo, Jed Kroncke, Urska Vellikonja, David Webber and to participants of the 
Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop in Boston, Columbia/FGV Conference in 
New York, FGV Direito SP Worshop in Sao Paulo. Errors are mine alone. 
  1. Henry G. Manne, in a study published in 1966, argued that insider trading 
should not be considered illegal, and he pointed out its benefits as being translated into 
more efficient markets, as well as in viewing the use of information as an instrument of 
company managers’ compensation. (Henry Manne. Insider Trading and the Stock 
market. New York: The Free Press, 1966, p. 456-461). For more recent thoughts of this 
author, see: Henry Manne. Keynote Address. Journal of Law, Economics & Policy, v. 4, 
n. 2, p. 225-232, 2008. For a summary of the debate in the U.S. academia and court 
precedents, see: Stephan M. Bainbridge Insider Trading: An Overview, 2000. Available 
at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=132529>. 
  2. Utpal Bhattacharya; Hazem Daouk. The World Price of Insider Trading. The 
Journal of Finance, v. 5, 1. ed., p. 75-108, 2002. Laura Nyantung Beny. Do Insider 
Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence. William Davidson 
Institute Working Paper, n. 741, 2005 
  3. Laura Beny, 2005. Arturo Bris. Do insider trading laws work? European 
Financial Management, vol. 11, n. 3, 2005, p. 267-312. Bart Frijns, Aaron Gilbert, 
Alizera Tourani-Rad. Do criminal sanctions deter insider trading? The Financial Review 
48, 2013, p. 205-232. Bart Frijns, Aaron Gilbert, Alizera Tourani-Rad. Elements of 
effective insider trading laws, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443597 
  4. Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, 2002. John C. Coffee Jr. Law and the 
Markets: The Impact of Enforcement. Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, n. 
304, 2007; Howell Jackson; Mark J. Roe. Public and private enforcement of securities 
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This Article is a contribution to comparative studies of the 
effectiveness of insider trading law. There have been several comparative 
studies that assessed enforcement using simplified proxies, such as the 
frequency of prosecution,5 as is done in the enforcement index created by 
World Bank-funded research studies. These studies have tended to suggest 
that emerging countries do not have effective systems for deterring illegal 
trading, either because of weakness in rules and sanctions, deficiencies in 
enforcement, or both. For example, there are generic claims, such as 
“developed countries have a better record of prosecution than emerging 
markets;”6 “like 70% of emerging markets who have the insider trading 
law, did not enforce the law” 7 or “[i]n Latin and Asian countries, insider 
trading scandals usually display linkages to political power.”8 
  While such studies often use very simplified—and possibly 
misleading—metrics, others dig more deeply into system operations 
describing enforcement outcomes in detail and providing more nuanced 
insights. Some papers organize results by comparing different countries,9 
and others describe countries in isolation.10 With the exception of China, 
however, most of these more detailed and useful studies deal with 
developed countries.11 
This Article seeks to fill that gap through a detailed study about the 
enforcement of insider trading laws in Brazil. The country is one of the 
world’s ten largest economies. It has a very large and active capital market 
with 328public companies in the stock market and USD 1, 232 million in 
market value.12 Yet, in the international debate about insider trading law, 
very little is known about Brazil except for a few poorly documented 
 
laws: Resource-based evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 93, n. 2, p. 207-238, 
2009. 
  5. E.g. Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, 2002. 
  6. Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, 2002, p. 104; 
  7. Utpal Bhattacharya; Hazem Daouk, When no law is better than a good law, 
Review of Finance (2009) 13, p. 578 
  8. Arturo Bris, 2005, p. 280. 
  9. Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan, Jasper Hedges, Ian Ramsay, Sanctions 
imposed for insider trading in Australia, Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States: An empirical study, Research 
Working Paper Series, Center for International Finance and Regulation – CIFR, June 
2016, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817172 
 10. Hui Huang. The regulation of insider trading in China: law and enforcement, 
2013, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378842 
 11. No reference was found on more detailed studies with information on India, 
Russia, and Brazil. 
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studies offering a negative understanding of the Brazilian insider trading 
enforcement system.13 This Article shows that the reality is different and 
fills a gap of knowledge about Brazil’s role in the battle against insider 
trading. Through empirical research on the enforcement institutions´ 
outcomes, it is possible to show the complexity and the relative 
effectiveness of the Brazilian system. The data gathered suggests that, 
regarding its enforcement regime, Brazil has advanced far beyond those 
countries that have formal insider trading laws but fails to enforce them.14 
Brazilian insider trading law goes back to 1976, following the 
postulate of equity of treatment for all investors in stock market. While the 
substantial law goes back decades, it is in recent years that enforcement has 
stepped up and additional sanctions have been added. In 2001, criminal 
sanctions were enacted for those required to keep information confidential, 
imposing a fine of up to three times the amount earned and a prison 
sentence. In 2017, all kinds of trading based on material, nonpublic 
information was criminalized.15 
In conducting the study of enforcement, in addition to considering 
the possibility of prosecution, we looked at institutional design and the 
various legal tools used by the enforcers. The study looked at the choice of 
regulatory tools and at the cooperation between institutions which may 
affect effectiveness, mainly on a criminal level. This broad description 
reveals mechanisms of the current system and points to challenging features 
that need specific enhancements in order to further improve enforcement.16 
 
 13. James H. Thompson, A Global Comparison of insider trading regulations, 
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2013, vol. 3, N.1, available 
at: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijafr/article/viewFile/3269/2976 
(arguing that “Insider trading is currently in Brazil and will likely continue until the 
government steps up its enforcement activities”); Otavio R. de Medeiros, Insider trading 
in the Brazilian Stock Market, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1457444 (concluding that “although 
an institutional framework exists in Brazil to fight insider-trading practices in the stock 
market, the actual success and willingness of the authorities with respects to this form of 
corruption is inefficient”). 
 14. See Utpal Bhattaharya, Hazem Daouk, 2009.. Based on their empirical 
research, the authors presented data about countries that have insider trading rules, but do 
not enforce them. 
 15. It is worth noting that in Brazil administrative punishment and criminal 
prosecution can coexist. 
 16. For other securities regulation enforcement perspective, for example, there 
is the private or public enforcement debate. For this perspective, see, e.g.: LaPorta, 
Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2006. “What Works in 
Securities Laws?” Journal of Finance 61 (1): 1-32. (defending the private enforcement as 
most efficient); Jackson, Howell Edmunds and Roe, Mark J., Public and Private 
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (March 16, 2009). Journal of 
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This Article sheds light on the importance of understanding the alternative 
regulation tools available to a single institution, as well as the coordination, 
competition, or conflict among the various institutions that participate in 
the enforcement system.   
 Following this Introduction, the remainder of the Article is divided 
into five sections. The first and second sections describe the Brazilian 
insider trading laws and the regulatory framework. The third section 
presents enforcement empirical data. The fourth section consolidates and 
provides a critical assessment of the main findings. Finally, a conclusion is 
presented. 
 
II. BRAZILIAN INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
 
  The objective of the Brazilian insider trading regulation is to 
guarantee a fair market with the equitable treatment of investors.17 For this 
purpose, since 1976, the legal system has prohibited trade based on 
material, nonpublic information. 18  
The Corporation Law proscribed the use of information that has not 
yet been revealed to the market. In origin, this legal provision was only 
applicable to directors and officers and outlined their duty of loyalty and, 
more specifically, their duty to maintain the integrity of any information 
not yet disclosed.19 The law expressly granted the right of the investor to be 
 
Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 93, 2009 (criticizing the idea that private enforcing is 
necessarily more efficient than public enforcement). 
 17. Nelson Eizirik, Insider trading in Brazil: Recent developments, 
https://www.pifsinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Latin-America-2008-
Symposium.pdf. 
 18. The first rule-prohibiting insider trading dates to 1965, in the article 3o. n. X 
of Law 4,728/1965 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L4728.htm] . However, 
there was no explicit outlawing of the use of nonpublic information. This rule only 
delineated the jurisdiction of the capital market regulator, which was the Central Bank. 
For a critical position on this rule, see Luís Gastão Paes de Barros Leães, Mercado de 
Capitais e “insider trading”, São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1982, p. 173 (arguing that 
not even the elements of insider trading were defined by the law); Fábio Konder 
Comparato, ‘Insider trading:’ sugestões para uma moralização do nosso mercado de 
capitais, Revista de Direito Mercantil, Industrial, Econômico e Finaceiro, n. 2, 1971, p. 
46-47. 
 19. According to Article 155, § 1 of the Law 6, 404/1976, the directors and 
officers of a publicly traded company are also responsible for maintaining the integrity of 
any piece of information not yet disclosed to the public that was obtained due to the 
individual’s position within the company and with the significance to influence the 
company’s share value. It is illegal for such individual to use such information to gain 
any advantage via the purchase or sale of company stocks. Under Article 155, § 2 of the 
Law 6,404/1976, the manager must ensure his or her subordinates, or third parties linked 
to them through a relationship of trust, neither divulge nor use privileged information. 
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compensated by directors or managers who violated the disclosure rules, 
either by providing false information, not maintaining confidentiality, or 
using privileged information for his or her own benefit.20  
The prohibition of trading on material, nonpublic information has 
been extended to other market players through administrative regulation. In 
1979, CVM enacted an administrative provision forbidding non-equitable 
practices and acts that yield “a treatment to any of the parties in securities 
transaction, directly or indirectly, effectively or potentially, that puts that 
party in an unequal position with respect to the remaining participants of 
the transaction.”21 With this rule as a baseline, the CVM began to punish 
people, beyond just director and managers, for the use of material, 
nonpublic information.22 
Later in 1984, and also by means of a CVM administrative provision 
related to the obligation to disclose material facts, there was a broader rule 
forbidding trade based on nonpublic information by people other than 
directors and managers.23 In addition, controlling shareholders were 
included on the list of people forbidden to trade based on nonpublic 
information.24 The prohibition was extended in order to reach all of those 
who had directly accessed information due to their professional position, 
function, or in collaboration with the corporation, even if indirectly.25  
The 2001 Capital Market Law reform brought other references to 
the use of material, nonpublic information. The legal prerogatives of the 
regulator were strengthened, and the CVM was expressively assigned the 
duty of protecting investors against the use of nonpublic information.26 This 
 
 20. Article 156, § 3, of Law 6,404/1976 states that, “Any person harmed by the 
purchase or sale of shares determined illegal by paragraphs 1 and 2 have the right to be 
compensated by the guilty party for all losses.” 
 21. CVM Rule 08/1979, II, d. 
[http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/instrucoes/inst008.html] 
 22. Alexandre Pinheiro dos Santos, Fábio Medina Osório, Julya Sotto Mayor 
Wellisch, Mercado de capitais. Regime Sancionador, São Paulo, Saraiva, 2012, p. 127; 
Nelson Eizirik, A Instrução CVM 31/84 e a regulamentação do ‘insider trading’, Revista 
de Direito Mercantil, Industrial, Econômico e Financeiro, n. 55, 1984 p. 170-175. All 
authors describing the use of CVM Rule 08/1979 in insider trading cases. 
 23. Regarding CVM Rule 31/1984 
[http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/instrucoes/inst031.html], in addition to the CVM 
Explanatory Note 28/1984 [http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/legislacao/notas-
explicativas/anexos/nota028.pdf], see Nelson Eizirik, A Instrução CVM 31/84 e a 
regulamentação do ‘insider trading’, Revista de Direito Mercantil, , Industrial, 
Econômico e Financeiro n. 55, 1984, p. 170-175. 
 24. CVM Rule 31/1984, Articles 9 and 10. 
 25. CVM Rule 31/1984, Articles 10 and 11. 
 26. Article 155, § 4, of Law 6,404/1976 (Corporation Law), as included in the 
Law 10,303/2001 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/LEIS_2001/L10303.htm]. 
This comes via section sub-item c of item IV in Article 4 of the Law 6,385/1976, which 
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power was also reinforced by a provision that made the use of nonpublic 
information illegal by any person that had access to it, not just director, 
managers and shareholders.27 In the following year, the CVM edited a 
provision to strengthen compliance regarding the prohibition of using 
material, nonpublic information. This provision outlawed trading by 
insiders both before and after announcement of material information for the 
market (fato relavante). 28  
In 2001, amid a movement to improve investor protection in the 
Brazilian capital markets, insider trading was criminalized for people who 
were charged with the obligation of maintaining informational secrecy (the 
duty of confidentiality). In 2017, the criminal consequences were extended 
to any person undertaking transactions based on material, nonpublic 
information. 29 Disclosure of confidential information by those with access 
to it by virtue of their professional position has also been criminalized. 30 
The criminal penalty established is a one to five year prison term and a fine 
of up to three times the amount resulting from the undue advantage that 
resulted from use of confidential information.31 For those trading with 
nonpublic information that is supposed to be kept confidential, like 
 
expressly states that the CVM will be responsible for “(...) IV. protecting shareholders 
and investors against: (...) c) the use of relevant information not previously disclosed to 
the market.” 
27. This comes from Article 155, § 4, Law 6.404, 1976. This rule clarifies the 
CVM’s administrative rule already provided in CVM Rule 31/1984. 
28. The new rule is as follows: “Art. 13. Before trading company stocks, the 
company must reveal any material facts to the company’s transactions.” (CVM Rule 
358/2002) [http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/instrucoes/inst358.html 
29. Art. 27-D, Law 6.385/1976 
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L6385.htm], as amended by Law 
13.506/2017 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-
2018/2017/lei/L13506.htm]: “Art. 27-D. Using any relevant non-disclosed information 
that may result, to oneself or to a third party, in unfair advantage, by trading securities on 
one’s or on third party’s behalf.” 
30. Art. 27-D, § 1o., Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017: “Art. 
27-D § 1o. Those who disclose any confidential information related to a material fact to 
which this person has had access due to their job or position in an issuing company or by 
virtue of a commercial or professional relationship or for having a trusting relationship 
with the issuing company are subject to the same penalty.” 
31. Law 6, 385/1976, as amended by Law 10, 303/2001, article 27-D. 
Criminalization in the terms of article 27-D, of Law 6,385/1976, in accordance with the 
Law 10, 303/2001, which includes the following provision: “Art. 27-D. Using relevant 
information not previously disclosed to the market, of which the parties in question are 
aware and which they were required to maintain secrecy, and which they were in a 
position to use for their own advantage or for the advantage of others through the 
negotiation of securities. The penalty will include between 1 to 5 years of imprisonment 
and a fine of up to 3 times to value illegal obtained from the transaction.” 
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shareholders, directors and managers, the penalty is increased by 1/3 (one 
third).32  
 
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO ENFORCE BRAZILIAN INSIDER 
TRADING LAWS 
 
  Enforcement of the insider trading laws may take place at the 
administrative, civil or criminal levels, and may involve different 
institutions using different legal tools.  
 
A. Administrative Level 
 
The CVM 33 is the Brazilian securities market regulator and a key 
enforcing institution of insider trading laws. In order to deal with the use of 
nonpublic information, the CVM has the duties to monitor the market and, 
if suspected insider trading practices are found, to institute a punitive 
administrative sanctioning proceeding (processo administrativo 
sancionador) to investigate illegal practices in the securities market. At the 
end, it must decide whether to punish or acquit the defendants.  
 Punishment may include warning, fine, suspension, temporary 
disqualification to hold positions in publicly traded corporations or 
intermediaries, suspension or revocation of the authorization to perform any 
activity on such market, or prohibition to transect directly or indirectly in 
the market.34 In a single case, these penalties can be in isolation or 
cumulatively. To set the fine cap, the law has four yardsticks: (1) fifty 
million Brazilian reais,35 (2) double the amount of the irregular transaction, 
(3) three times the amount of the economic advantage gained or loss 
avoided due to the violation, or (4) double the investors’ damage. 36 Since 
 
32. Art. 27-D, § 2o., Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017. “Art. 
27-D (…) §2o.: The penalty is increased by 1/3 (one third) if the agent commits the 
crime set out in the heading of this article using any relevant information they have had 
access to but was supposed to keep it confidential.” 
33. CVM was established by Law 6,385/1976 as the specialized authority 
regulating the securities market, thus replacing the Central Bank of Brazil. The laws 
10,303/2001 and 10,411/2002 
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/2002/L10411.htm] delegated further 
administrative power to the CVM as a regulatory and supervisory agency with jurisdiction 
over the securities market, similar to the regulatory agencies created during the 1990s’ in 
Brazil. 
34. Art. 11, Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017 
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2017/lei/L13506.htm]. 
 35. This amount is equal to approximately USD 13,600,000 (1 USD = BRL 3.97 
as of 05/30/19 according to Brazilian Central Bank). 
 36. Art. 11, § 1o., Law 6.385/1976, as amended by Law 13.506/2017. 
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2017, with the reform of the capital market law, the CVM can still enter 
into leniency agreements (acordo de leniência) with regulated parties to 
seek reduction of penalties.  
The punitive decision of the CVM may be made more severe, 
attenuated, or ruled to be unenforceable by the second level administrative 
court (Conselho de Recursos do Sistema Financeiro Nacional) (“CRSFN”). 
The CRSFN was created in 1985 and is linked to the Ministry of Finance.37 
It is an institution consisting of eight members, half of whom are chosen by 
government authorities and half by the private sector.38 CRSFN decisions 
can still be re-examined by courts. 
At the administrative level, the regulated parties investigated for 
wrongdoing are allowed to enter into a settlement (termo de compromisso) 
with the CVM.39 Through this regulatory tool, in a consensual way, the 
CVM suspends the administrative sanctioning proceeding. In turn, the 
regulated party is required to end the investigated practice and correct any 
irregularities in addition to providing compensation for incurred injuries. 
This legal tool is a “neither-admit-nor deny” instrument.40 It is important to 
highlight that settlements do not rule out the possibility for a criminal case. 
The decision to reach a settlement is made by the CVM “at its sole 
discretion, if the public interest allows.”41 The law does not set strict 
parameters for the decision. It only establishes that the “opportunity and 
convenience of the settlement and appropriateness of the proposal”42 should 
be assessed, and the nature and gravity of the violations, the records of the 
accused, and the effective possibility of punishment in the actual case 
should be considered.43 There is neither review by the courts in this 
administrative decision, nor participation by the CRSFN. 
 
 37. CRSFN was created by Decree 19,152/1985 
[http://planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1980-1989/D91152.htm]. For empirical analysis 
of the CRSFN’s activity regarding capital market issues, see Juliana Bonocorsi de Palma, 
Viviane Muller Prado, Estudos avançados de mercado de capitais. Conselho de Recurso 
do Sistema Financeiro Nacional, São Paulo, Elsevier, 2014. 
 38. The Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the CVM) and half who are 
appointed by market entities (ANBIMA- Brazilian Financial and Capital Markets 
Association, FEBRABAN – Brazilian Banks Association, ANCORD – Brazilian Broker 
Association, and ABRASCA – Public Companies Association). 
 39. Article 11, §§ 5 to 8, of the Law 6,385/1976, as writing in Law 9, 457/1997 
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9457.htm]. 
 40. Article 11, § 6 and Article 4, CVM Decision (Deliberação) 390, 2001 
[http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/deliberacoes/deli0300/deli390.html]. 
 41. Expressions used in Article 11, § 5, Law 6, 385/1976, as amended by Law 
9,457/1997. 
 42. Article 8, CVM Decision 390/2001, as amended by CVM Decision 486, 
2005. [http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/deliberacoes/deli0400/deli486.html] 
 43. Article 9, CVM Decision 390/2001, as amended by CVM Decision 486, 
2005. 
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B. Criminal Level 
 
For criminal consequences, the CVM is obliged to communicate the 
insider trading case to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministério 
Público Federal) (“MPF”) at the very beginning of the punitive 
administrative proceeding or after a settlement decision. The public 
prosecutors have two options: file a criminal lawsuit or dismiss the case if 
there is not sufficient evidence of a crime wrongdoing. In the first option, 
criminal courts thus have the final decision. In the second, courts must agree 
with the dismissal. In the criminal judicial sphere, the CVM can only act 
jointly with the MPF assisting it. The market regulator has no standing to 
sue in the criminal sphere. 
 
C. Civil Level 
 
Insider trading has potential liability consequences at the civil level. 
A lawsuit can be filed in order to compensate for losses caused by the use 
of material, nonpublic information to the market or to individual investors. 
The compensation can be sought individually or collectively through 
lawsuits brought by those who have been harmed.  
The collective instrument to seek compensation is a public-interest 
civil lawsuit (Ação Civil Pública) filed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and/or by the CVM. Since 1989, the law has expressly provided legal 
standing to the public prosecutor, by means of a CVM decision or based on 
its own prerogative, to pursue judicial measures in order to avoid losses or 
obtain compensations for losses to protect investors. 
It is possible to consensually end the litigation in a public-interest 
civil lawsuit by signing another kind of settlement, a consent decree (Termo 
de compromisso e ajustamento de conduta) (“TAC”). The judiciary must 
approve this decision. However, as in the case of a settlement, criminal 
charges may still be brought against the defendant.44 Signing the settlement 
or consent decree does not imply a confession per se, nor an explicit 






 44. Article 5, § 6., of the Law 7,347/1985 (Public Civil Action Law) 
[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L7347orig.htm], according to the Law 
8,078/1990 [http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L8078.htm]; Article art. 11, § 5 
of Law 6,385/1976; Article 7, CVM Decision 390, 2001; and Article 5, § 6. of Law 
7,347/1985. 
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D. The Regulatory Enforcement Framework 
 
The following table (Table 1) summarizes the instruments and 
institutions that may participate in the enforcement system regarding the 
prohibition of trading based on material, nonpublic information in the 
Brazilian capital market. 
 

























Settlement Regulated party CVM 
Obligation to 
































































2020] ENFORCING INSIDER TRADING LAW 103 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW IN NUMBERS FROM 2008 TO 
2018 
 
A. Research Methodology 
 
 The empirical data gathering mechanisms come from a variety of 
sources and follow a few routines which are described above. For all the 
researched legal institutions (CVM, CRSFN, Courts), we were comfortable 
to use keywords as regular expressions in a python environment. The 
patterns we used were: 'infor.{,10}privi.*?\W', 'insider', 
'infor.{,8}relev.*?\W', 'oscila.{,8}at.p.*?\W', '08/79', '31/84', '358/02', 
'(fat.{,8}rele.*?)\W' and '\D(155)\D'. When handling judicial decisions, this 
was not possible, mainly due to the large quantity of documents. So, we 
used a more traditional approach for the federal courts of the second45 and 
third46 regions (Tribunais Federais da Segunda e Terceira Região). On 
those websites and for criminal purpose, we used the keywords "penal" e 
"insider trading", "art. 27-D" and "penal" e "informação privilegiada".  
 To find CVM decisions on punitive administrative proceedings, the 
first route possible is the search tool presented on their website, which is 
intended to apply criteria in documents within the procedures.47 However, 
this tool does not allow for a deep search, and its parameters are very 
limited. Our solution was to map the procedures through another part of the 
website.48 After inserting all the possible combinations for the parameters 
(around 240,000), we ended up with all the existing proceedings, along with 
a brief description of its object, purpose, and acts. Finally, we ran the above-
mentioned keywords to find possible matches, and then we manually read 
the decisions.  
We found a total of 401 CVM rulings and selected 65 specific cases 
about insider trading wrongdoing in the period of 2008-2018. The data was 
organized with the following categories of information: (i) number of cases 
per year; (ii) number of defendants per year; (iii) CVM final ruling (number 
of defendants punished and number of defendants acquitted per year); (iv) 
defendant’s position (internal, external, or market agent); (v) type of 
material, nonpublic information (merger and acquisitions transactions, 
 





 46. Link used for the research: http://web.trf3.jus.br/base-textual 
 47. Link used for the research: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/sancionadores/index.html 
 48. Link used for the research: http://sistemas.cvm.gov.br/?PAS 
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change in the corporation control, financial information, or corporate 
business information); (v) type of CVM penalty (fine, warning, or 
suspension; (vi) ratio between profit based on the use of insider information 
and the amount of the fine.  
 For the decisions on CVM’s settlement decisions (Termos de 
Compromisso), the website offered similar problems regarding text 
filtering.49 Here, we collected all the decisions by searching for all the 
possible dates between 2008 and 2018. Afterward, we ran all the above-
mentioned keywords and read the matching results. We found a total of 507 
CVM settlement decisions and selected only 57 specific cases about insider 
trading wrongdoing. The data was organized with the following categories 
of information: (i) number of settlement proposals and cases per year; (ii) 
number of accepted settlement proposal per year; (iii) number of denied 
settlement proposal per year; and (iv) ratio between suspected profit based 
on the use of insider information and the amount of the pecuniary obligation 
on the settlement.  
 Regarding the CRSFN’s decisions, we faced a different problem: 
this institution deals with appeals from different administrative branches, 
such as the Brazilian Central Bank, CVM, money laundering control, and 
insurance regulator. However, we were only interested in appeals facing 
CVM decisions. Our solution was to filter in the website50 for the term 
“CVM.” This resulted in approximately 1,000 decisions. Afterward, we ran 
keywords and read the matching results. We found a total of 228 CRSFN 
judgments and selected 37. The data was organized with the following 
categories of information: (i) number of cases per year; (ii) CRSFN’s 
decision to review or uphold the CVM’s ruling; and (iii) if CRSFN’s 
decision review the ruling resulted in a better or worse outcome for the 
defendant.  
 
B. Enforcement in Numbers: An Overview 
 
  In Brazil, from 2008 to 2018, 51 there were 54 punitive 
administrative cases ruled on by the CVM related to insider trading. These 
 
 49. Link used for the research: http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/index.html 
 50. Link used for the research: 
https://www.bcb.gov.br/crsfn/ementasacordaos.html 
 51. Por a previous time, see Nora Rachman, O princípio do full disclosure no 
mercado de capitais, 1999 (University of São Paulo’s master dissertation not published). 
According to Nora Rachman’s research project, which considers the period between 
1976 and 1988, the administrative process of penalizing after insider trading became 
more constant at the CVM. There was a total of “29 administrative inquiries into the 
subject of insider trading, aiming at investigating the occurrence of irregularities and 
applying sanctions, having acquitted the defendant in 10 cases and finding substantial 
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cases involved 158 defendants and resulted mostly in fines corresponding 
in two or three times the value of profit from the transaction. During the 
same period, there were 42 settlement agreements signed involving 72 
persons and three consent decrees involving three persons. Most of the 
settlements and consent decrees establish a payment of an amount usually 
equal to two or three times the gain value. At the criminal level, there were 
only two final court decisions, both involving previous cases tried by the 
CVM, but just one imprisonment (later replaced by community service), 
along with a fine of three times the amount of the profit and a ban on future 
participation in trading in the securities market. 
The table below (Table 2) shows the big picture of the insider 
trading enforcement system outcome.  
 
Table 02. Insider trading laws enforcement in numbers (2008 -
2018) 
 
Level Regulatory tools  
Number 





















punishments Fine (two or 
three times 
the profits) 
























evidence of insider trading in the remaining 19.” From the 19 adjudicated cases, 19 of the 
indicted parties were acquitted and 23 convicted. The punishments handed out included 
fines (11 indicted), warnings (9), and suspension (3). It is interesting to note that the 
1990s were a period in which few investigations into illicit activities were initiated, with 
only five insider trading cases adjudicated in a 10-year period. 
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C. Enforcement in Detail 
 
1. Administrative Level 
 
a) Data on Punitive Administrative Proceedings (Processo Administrativo 
Sancionador) 
 
  From the outset, pursuing punitive action in cases of insider trading 
was on the CVM’s enforcement agenda. It is worth noting that the first CVM 
trial was in 1978 and involved punishment for the use of material, nonpublic 
information. 52 From 2008 to 2018, the CVM ruled on 54 administrative 
cases related to insider trading. From 2010 on, the number of cases ranged 
from three to ten per year (Graph 01). This piece of information suggests that 
the illegal use of material, nonpublic information is a constant focus of the 
CVM’s enforcement, but varies over the years. 
 
 
 52. To access the CVM’s decision on the SERVIX case, see Inquéritos 
Administrativos julgados pela CVM, vol. 1, 1979, p. 11-43. 
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Graph 01 – Punishment and acquittal of insider trading defendants 
and cases tried by CVM (per year) – (2008-2018) 
 
The 54 cases involved 158 defendants. Regarding punishments, 66 
defendants were convicted, and 92 were acquitted at the administrative 
level. The number of cases and convicted parties vary over the year. In 2008 
and in 2012, respectively, the four and five cases judged resulted in 22 
defendants punished each year. But, in 2017, only five defendants were 
punished in ten cases. A possible explanation of the change in numbers is, 
not that CVM was lenient in punishing suspicious acts regarding the use of 
nonpublic information but, that there were some errors in the monitoring of 
the market, or there were decisions made in going further with difficult or 
“bad” cases. 
 As the Brazilian law includes anyone using nonpublic information 
as an illegal transaction, the position of those defendants, as well as whether 
they have been convicted or acquitted, is a relevant piece of information to 
assess the effectiveness of the insider trading laws in all extensions. To 
collect this information properly, the research used three categories to 
classify the defendants: internal, external, and market agents. Internal 
includes those who have a direct and permanent link with the issuer, 
including shareholders, board of directors members, managers, and 
employees. External are those who have a direct link with the issuer through 
their professional position and access to the material and confidential 
information, such as lawyers or financial agents that work as consultants on 
a merger or an acquisition transaction. The market group is residual and 
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includes those who are neither internal nor external, such as individual 
investors, relatives of internal agents, investment funds, and brokers. 
Using this classification of defendants, the result was: 79 internal, 
three external, and 74 market agents and investors.53 This data deserves two 
comments. First, the extension of the rule regarding the use of nonpublic 
information to include people beyond shareholders, directors, and managers 
is covered by the CVM’s enforcement. 54 Second, knowing that the market 
intermediaries and investors represented almost 50% of all of defendants 
causes us to reflect on the instruments capable of mitigating the effects of 
information leaking outside of the issuing company. In addition, it is 
relevant to cross-reference the positions of the defendants with the 
judgement decisions in order to assess the extent of effective enforcement, 
mainly for those other than corporation agents. This information can be 
easily visualized in the graph (Graph 02) below. 
 
Graph 02 - Punishment and acquittal and defendant positions in CVM 
cases (2008-2018) 
 
 53. For another way of classifying primary and secondary actors see: Nelson 
Eizirik, Insider trading in Brazil: Recent developments, 
https://www.pifsinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Latin-America-2008-
Symposium.pdf 
 54. CVM Rule 08, 1979, changed by CVM Rule 31, 1984; Article 155, § 4, Law 
6,404/1976. 
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This data mainly points out the high number of punishments of 
market investors, despite the theoretical difficulty in demonstrating that the 
origin of a trade resulted directly from access and use of nonpublic 
information. Another piece of relevant information is related to internal 
defendants: shareholders were the most punished actor in this category. 
This result points to a strong hypothesis of insider trading as a private 
benefit of controlling positions that needs to be tested. Board of directors’ 
members and managers (agents very close to the confidential information) 
have been frequently indicted, but not necessarily punished.  
To better assess the Brazilian insider trading law enforcement, 
knowing what kind of material, nonpublic information gives rise to an 
insider trading case is important. The results reveal that a large amount of 
the information involves mergers and acquisitions transitions (27 cases), 
mainly changes in corporate control. Also, financial information (15 cases) 
and information about corporate business (10 cases) gives rise to insider 
trading cases. A small part is private decision information (two cases).  
Another relevant piece of data is the type of penalty in CVM rulings. 
The research reveals that a fine is the most common penalty used by the 
regulator, representing almost 95% of the penalties, followed by, in small 
number, warnings and suspensions. For 47 of the CVM rulings that the 
defendant was punished with a fine, the profit or loss avoided was expressly 
mentioned to set the amount of the pecuniary sanction. The CVM tends to 
calculate its fines by multiplying the profit earned or the loss avoided by 
either two or three times the amount as shown in the table below (Table 03). 
 
Table 03. Ratio between the profit/loss avoided and the amount of the fine 
(2008-2018) 
 
Pecuniary penalty value criterion Times 
applied 
Twice the value of the profit 22 
Three times the value of the profit 13 
One and a half times the value of the profit 8 
Once the value of the profit 2 
Maximum standard of BRL 500,000 2 
Total 47 
 
It is worth noting that the vast majority of insider trading cases ruled 
on by the CVM do not include large volumes of gains. As shown in the 
chart below, the research results suggest that the transactions analyzed by 
the CVM do not involve huge monetary gains, most being less than USD 
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500,000.55 There were only a few cases involving gains above USD 2 
million, and in half of them, the defendants were acquitted.  
 
Graph 03. Volume of gain or loss avoided in insider cases X acquitted or 




 Considering that the CVM’s punishment decisions can be reviewed 
by the CRSFN, which is the second administrative instance, it is worth 
determining whether the CVM’s decisions to punish the use of insider 
trading are upheld or reviewed by the CRSFN. See Table 04 below. 
 






2008 57 55 2 
2009 5 4 1 
2010 4 4 0 
2011 0 0 0 
2012 25 22 3 
2013 3 3 0 
2014 13 13 0 
2015 14 5 9 
 
 55. To convert BRL in USD, see: 
https://www.bcb.gov.br/estabilidadefinanceira/historicocotacoes. 
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2016 13 12 1 
2017 29 20 9 
2018 18 15 3 
Total 181 153 28 
 
According to the research findings in the same period, 2008 to 2018, 
the CRSFN decided 37 cases related to insider trading wrongdoing 
involving 281 individuals. The CRSFN upheld the CVM’s decision for 153 
individuals and reviewed for just 28. For 11 individuals, the CRSFN 
reviewed the case and increased the fine amount. For the others 17 
individuals, the CRSFN reversed the CVM’s judgment either by acquitting 
the convicted defendants or decreasing the fine.  
 
b) Data on Settlements (Termo de Compromisso) 
 
The following data was found regarding the use of settlements in 
cases of insider trading from 2008 to 2018. See Graph 04 below. 
 
Graph 04 – Total number of proposals for settlements related to insider 




This data suggests that proposals for settlements in cases of insider 
trading constantly appear for the CVM’s consideration, and the rate of 
acceptance varies. From 2008 to 2018, 57 cases involving 112 persons 
(individual and legal persons) with suspicions of insider trading were 
considered by the CVM for a settlement decision. The regulator accepted 
50 and denied 62 persons suspected of trading based on material, nonpublic 
information.  
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All settlement proposals involved an obligation of a pecuniary 
amount to be payed to the government. When the settlement delineated how 
much was gained in the transaction or how much loss was avoided, the 
method used to establish the value of the obligation, with few exceptions, 
was to double the measured benefit. The fine criteria and whether the 
proposal was accepted or denied is shown in the table below (Table 05). 
 
Table 05. Ratio between the profit/loss avoided and the amount of the 
pecuniary obligation (2008-2018) 
  
Proposed value criterion Accepted Denied 
No relation with the conduct 24 10 
Minimum standard of BRL 150,000 11 12 
Once the value of the profit 10 4 
Twice the value of the profit 10 13 
Three times the value of the profit 2 8 
Other types of criteria related to the 
conduct 5 3 
Total 62 50 
 
The argument may be put forward that, according to the law, the 
value in question is not the only criteria for making a decision regarding 
whether the use of a settlement is convenient and opportune. However, the 
basis of the regulator’s decision whether to accept a settlement or not often 
revolves around whether the “value being offered is sufficient to dissuade 
similar actions by the accused and by third parties,” “if the value being 
offered is adequate,” and “if the proposal is proportional to the graveness 
of the wrongdoing in question.” Besides these bases, the final decision is 
often supported by words such as “convenient and opportune” and “a win 
for the public administration that was quickly processed with minimum 
cost.” This vague reasoning creates doubts as to the real causes behind these 
decisions and opens the possibility for inequity in the treatment of regulated 
parties. 
 
2. Criminal Level  
 
Insider trading was criminalized in 2001,56 but the first criminal 
case was brought just in 2009. The initiative can be explained as the result 
 
 56. With the amendment of Law 6,385/1976 for the Law 10,303/2001 (which 
including the addition of Article 27-D). 
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of the signing in 2008 of a cooperation agreement between the CVM and 
the Federal Public Prosecutor in which the two institutions agreed to 
exchange information and collaborate in response to crimes against the 
capital market. 
Until 2018, the Brazilian enforcement system had only produced 
two final decisions on the criminal level involving insider trading cases. 
The first criminal case was a transaction in which Sadia launched an offer 
for a voluntary acquisition of Perdigão’s stocks in the market.57 Sadia’s 
managers traded Perdigão’s American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) using information that had yet to be 
disclosed to the market. The case was first investigated by the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which accused the Investor Relationship 
Officer, a member of the board of directors, and an employee at the 
financial institution that had participated in the offer (ABN Amron) of 
insider trading. In 2007, the parties under investigation arrived at a 
cooperation agreement with the SEC which barred them from participating 
in market activities for a certain period of time and required them to pay a 
fine.  
The case was also analyzed in the administrative sphere by the 
CVM which decided to suspend the individuals from holding a position in 
publicly traded companies58. This was also the first case in which the 
defendant was prosecuted criminally for insider trading. In 2008, the CVM 
communicated the incident to the Federal Public Prosecutor which filed the 
case in 2009. One defendant was indeed found guilty in the higher court 
(Superior Tribunal de Justiça), with the conviction including a fine and 
suspension from all trading activities in 2016. 59 The other indicted party’s 
investigation ended with a settlement. 
The second case involved Randon S.A., a company in the cargo 
transportation field. 60 The controlling shareholder, his family (wife and 
son), and some other managers traded shares two months before the 
announcement of a new partner in August 2002, an American company 
 
 57. S.T.J. Recurso Especial n. 1.569.171. São Paulo, Relator: Min. Gurgel de 
Faria, 16/02/2016, R.T. 967, p. 477 
 58. C.V.M., Processo Administrativo Sancionador SP n. 2007/0117, Relator: 
Dir. Eli Loria, 26/02/2008, available at 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/sancionadores/sancionador/anexos/2008/20080
226_PAS_SP20070117.pdf ; C.V.M. Processo Administrativo Sancionador n. 
2007/0118, Relator: Dir. Marcos Barbosa Pinto, 26/02/2008, available at 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/sancionadores/sancionador/anexos/2008/20080
226_PAS_SP20070118.pdf 
 59. S.T.J. Recurso Especial n. 1.569.171. São Paulo, Relator: Min. Gurgel de 
Faria, 16/02/2016, R.T. 967, p. 477 
 60. Justiça Federal, 6ª Vara Criminal - São Paulo. Ação Penal nº 123 0009474- 
42.2009.4.03.6181,17/12/2012, D.O. 10/01/2013. 
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named ArvinMerit. During the interim period, the company’s stock value 
increased by 120%. The lawsuit filed by the Federal Public Prosecutor of 
Rio Grande do Sul against six accused agents occurred at the beginning of 
2010. After discussions regarding jurisdiction, the case ended up in the 
Criminal Branch of Sao Paulo, which specializes in financial crimes and 
money laundering.61 In July 2012, the process was suspended when the 
Federal Public Prosecutor accepted a settlement in which the accused 
agents paid individual fines to the CVM, in addition to completing 
community service and making an appearance in front of the court. For two 
of the accused agents, the penalty was diminished due to age. 
In the two criminal processes, the CVM appears as an assistant party 
to the denouncement. As the CVM and the Federal Public Prosecutor have 
said, these cases are the “result of an effort for integrated work between the 
attorney’s office and the CVM, which have acted together to inhibit and 
combat illicit practices in the capital market.” 
 
3. Civil Liability Sphere 
 
The Corporation Law included a direct reference to the right of 
investors to seek compensation from the directors and managers that trade 
on nondisclosed information, in addition to the possibility of applying the 
general rule of civil liability embodied in the Civil Code. Just a few cases 
in which an investor sought compensation for losses due to insider trading 
have been found.  
The first case dates to 1977 and is the first insider trading case 
judged by the CVM. In that case, a group of investors were seeking 
indemnification after having purchased SERVIX stock during the period 
immediately preceding the divulging of facts relevant to the business of the 
company.62 Two suits were brought, but neither were successful. The 
second case involved ITAP and took place in 1981.63 In that case, the 
company’s stocks experienced significant oscillation immediately 
preceding the announcement of a buy back scheme in an attempt to go 
private. The investors in that case were also unsuccessful.  
However, there are some public initiatives in filing public-interest 
lawsuits by the public prosecutor and CVM. Since 1990, the public 
 
 61. Justiça Federal, 6ª Vara Criminal - São Paulo. Ação Penal nº 123 0009474- 
42.2009.4.03.6181, 17/12/2012, D.O. 10/01/2013. 
 62. T.J.S.P., Ap. Civ. n. 12.145-1, São Paulo Relator: Des. Galvão Coelho, 
27/10/1981, Decision published at Revista de Direito Mercantil, Industrial, Econômico e 
Financeiro, n.109, 1998, p. 173-177 
 63. T.J.R.J., Ap. Civ. 27.882-1, Rio de Janeiro, Relator: Des. Penalva Santos, 
27/12/1983, Decision published at Nelson Eizirik, Aurélio W Bastos, Mercado de 
Capitais e S.A. – Jurisprudência, CNBV, vol. 1, 1987, p. 295. 
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prosecutor and the CVM are authorized to execute consent decrees whereby 
they effectively suspend administrative proceedings and civil liability 
lawsuits. There is judicial supervision as the courts must approve the 
administrative decision.64 So far, the CVM and the federal public 
prosecutor have only signed four consent decrees,65 three of which refer to 
insider trading cases. In two of the three consent decrees, the criteria to 
establish the value of the pecuniary obligation was three times the profit. 
The money was paid to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Interests (Fundo 
de Defesa de Direitos Difusos) in both cases, and in one, they agreed to pay 
the investors’ counterpart in the operation of buying or selling. In two of 
the three, they agreed to non-pecuniary obligations: they were not allowed 
to occupy a position of public listed companies or intermediaries in the 
capital market for three years.  
The first consent decree was signed in 2008 in a case that involved 
insider trading and established the possibility of investor compensation.66 
The foreign company, Vailly S.A., supposedly bought preferred stock from 
Suzano before the announcement of a material fact reporting the transfer of 
the company’s controlling block of stock. Vailly S.A. then sold these shares 
on the market shortly after the announcement and earned more than 500,000 
BRL in the process. The CVM and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office filed a 
public-interest civil action seeking “payment of compensation for the 
diffuse damage that it allegedly caused to the securities market and to 
society” in an amount three times the net gain that the company derived 
from Suzano’s stock sales. They also sought “indemnification for 
individual homogeneous damage caused to investors who negotiated with 
Vailly before the announcement of the material fact.” A consent decree was 
signed to settle the suit and the administrative proceeding, and Vailly was 
ordered to pay 2,000,000 BRL. This amount was required to be paid ten 
days after the Consent Decree was approved in court.  
As stated in the court decision that ratified this agreement, a portion 
of the amount (1,425,600 BRL) would be assigned to the Fund for the 
Defense of Diffuse Rights (Fundo de Defesa de Dirietos Difusos), and the 
remainder (551,450 BRL) would compensate individual investors. The 
 
 64. Article 5 o, § 6 o, the Law of Public-Interest Civil Action, as restated by 
Law 8,078/1990. 
 65. For information about the consent decree, see CVM document available at: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/noticias/anexos/2018/20180508_atuacoes_conj
untas_CVM_MPF.pdf Apart from the three mentioned settlements, there are also the 
settlements in the case of Aracruz, which were signed in 2012 and 2013. These 
established payment to the CVM and to the Fund for Defense of Diffuse Interests. 
 66. CVM, Termo de Compromisso e Ajustamento de Conduta Proc. RJ 
2007/12231, 04/03/2008, available at: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2008/20080304_R1/20080304_D01.html. 
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judge’s reasoning was that the investors should be entitled to the net income 
that Vailly earned in the trade carried out based on the insider information. 
The amount would be left in a savings account for twelve months. Any 
amount not claimed by investors would be credited back to the Fund for the 
Defense of Diffuse Interests. The CVM advised the counterparties in the 
transactions that the amount was available to be claimed. 
The second consent decree involving insider trading was signed in 
2009.67 As in the first case, stocks were traded prior to disclosure of a 
material fact announcing the transfer of a controlling block of shares and 
the subsequent sale by someone that was part of the controlling group as 
well as a member of the board of directors of the company Tenda. The buyer 
was ordered to resign from the director position for three years and to pay 
200,000 BRL to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Interests. 
The third consent decree involving insider trading was signed in 
2010.68 As in the cases above, someone (an executive manager of Petrobrás) 
traded Ipiranga stock before the announcement of a material fact reporting 
the transfer of Ipiranga’s controlling stake to Petrobras, Ultra, and Braskem. 
Also, as in the case above, the consent decree suspended the sanctioning 
administrative proceeding in the CVM and extinguished the public-interest 
civil action and the Innominate Provisional Remedy. The amount, as in the 
other case, was three times higher than the earnings derived in the illegal 
trading, which totaled 360,202.75 BRL. Since no third parties were 
identified, the CVM decided that the money should be paid to the Fund for 
the Defense of Diffuse Interests. In addition to the payment, the executive 
was prohibited from trading stocks for three years. 
It is interesting to observe the use of consent decree concerning 
three issues: (1) non-pecuniary obligation, (2) criterion for the 
determination of the settlement value, (3) and the recipient of the values 
paid in the consent decree.  
There are three concerns arising from these cases. The first is related 
to the existence of non-pecuniary obligations of the investigated party. Not 
being allowed to participate in the market is understood as the most onerous 
measure for a capital market participant. However, this measure does not 
appear frequently in other regulatory instruments, including administrative 
processes and settlements. 
The second is related to the criterion used to establish the value of the 
 
 67. CVM, Termo de Compromisso e Ajustamento de Conduta, Proc. RJ 
2009/0428, 03/02/2009, available at: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2009/20090203_R1/20090203_D13.html 
 68. CVM, Termo de Compromisso e Ajustamento de Conduta, Proc. RJ 
2010/0963, 22/06/2010, available at: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2010/20100622_R1/20100622_D01.html 
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pecuniary penalty. The criterion was set at three times the gain or the 
avoided loss. This is the same criterion that has been utilized in past 
sanctioning processes and is the highest possible pecuniary penalty. Indeed, 
it is higher than the criterion used in settlements. Since decrees have the 
goal of ending a public civil action that aims to compensate the losses 
caused, it is interesting to ask how close this value comes to the value used 
in pecuniary penalties handed down by the regulator, especially since there 
is often little attempt to verify the damage caused to the market or to 
investors. 
The third observation seems to be the most problematic. It is related 
to the recipients of the money paid by the investigated party. In the first 
case (Vailly), part of the money went to a Fund for the Defense of Diffuse 
Interests and another part went to investors. In both of the following cases 
(Tenda and Ipiranga), the money went only to the Fund. Despite 
recognizing that the decision to pay the counterpart investors does not seem 
to be the most adequate way forward, sending the whole of this money to 
the Fund seems to be an even worse solution. This opinion is based on the 
fact that there is no benefit accrued to the capital market, especially for the 
improvement of oversight or the market supervision to verify the frankness 
and strength of the enforcement of the administrative sanction processes. 
 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
A. Local Challenges 
   
The results of the quantitative empirical research suggest that the 
CVM is the main enforcer of insider trading laws, since there are more 
criminal than civil cases to ban the use of nonpublic information in the 
Brazilian stock market. Another research finding is that cases receive very 
different responses from the enforcement system, and that is not necessarily 
a consequence of burden of proof difficulties, the position of the 
defendants, or of any case details. The different consequences might be 
related to the tools that were triggered and the enforcer that participated in 
the enforcement process. 
Recently, comparative literature showed that countries with similar 
rules may have different enforcement procedures and outcomes.69 How 
about the different results within just one legal system? It is exactly what 
we observe in the numbers in Brazil: the existing cases reached different 
outcomes depending on which regulatory tools were applied and which 
institutions had been proactive in verifying the insider trade. 
 
 69. Mathias Siems, The EU Market Abuse Directive: A Case-Based Analysis. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1066603 
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The vast majority of the insider trading cases have only been 
assessed at the administrative level, whether by final decision in a punitive 
administrative proceeding or by settlement, mostly resulting in the party 
paying two or three times the profit or loss avoided. In just one case with 
criminal consequences, the first criminal insider trading case 
(Sadia/Perdigão), the manager agreed to pay a certain amount to the U.S. 
regulator and, in Brazil, combining administrative and criminal punitive 
decisions, was fined six times the gain (three times in the administrative 
and three in the criminal). The manager was also prohibited from being 
manager in a public corporation. 
Another example is a case that ended up at the administrative level 
with a consent decree in the Irpiranga/Petrobras case.70 The consent decree 
suspended the sanctioning administrative proceeding in the CVM and 
extinguished the public-interest civil lawsuit. The manager agreed to pay 
three times the earnings derived from the illegal trading and paid it to the 
Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Interests to repair losses by the market. In 
addition to the payment, the executive was prohibited from trading stocks 
for three years. 
These results suggest three preliminary conclusions that could 
improve the insider trading ban in a market. First, reforms in the substantial 
law, such as criminalizing the insider trading or a higher the penalty, may 
be the starting point to combat the use of nonpublic information, but is 
never the final stop. Second, the regulatory framework and legal tools are 
important features in the enforcement outcomes. Third, analyze deeply the 
complexity of the enforcement system is needed to identify the pros and 
con of the multi-institutional model.  
In order to better understand the local challenges to improve the 
effectiveness of insider trading laws, analysis of the various cases may be 
divided into two perspectives. The first one is internal and by the CVM. 
This perspective sheds light on use, by the regulator, of a range of 
regulatory instruments to deal with the trading based in nonpublic 
information (namely, the administrative sanctioning process, consent 
decrees, settlements, and leniency agreements). The second perspective 
analyzes the relationship among the institutions assigned to confront the 
unlawful practice of insider trading in the administrative, criminal, and civil 





 70. The Board of Commissioners decision is available at: 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/decisoes/2010/20100622_R1/20100622_D01.html 
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B. The CVM’s Internal Perspective 
 
In the administrative enforcement system side, the first important 
decision is whether the CVM will pursue the punitive route or if the party 
will propose a settlement agreement, consent decree, or leniency agreement 
to use a consensual process to end the case. By looking at the quantitative 
data, it is relevant to understand how and when different legal tools and 
regulatory choices are used with regards to the regulator’s perspective or 
the regulated party’s interests. 
If the number of administrative sanction proceedings adjudicated 
for insider trading and the number of settlements in 2008, 2009, 2013, 2016, 
and 2017 are compared, we note that the number of proposed settlements is 
very near the number of the punitive proceedings. This information 
suggests that settlements are relevant to the sanction process for 
understanding the CVM’s enforcement. If we compare the value of the 
penalty with the pecuniary obligation of the settlement decree, it can be 
seen that the instruments are very similar because, in most cases, they 
establish the penalty in question as twice the value of the gain attained from 
using insider information. 
Since the consensual path is followed quite frequently, does this 
suggest that the system’s deterrent effect is quite limited? At first glance, it 
might seem so. After all, when cases are resolved consensually, there is no 
recognition that unlawful practices occurred, and this might seem to 
weaken the deterrent effect of the CVM’s actions. However, on close 
analysis, it seems that the consensual route may be as effective as the 
punitive one once we take into account the actual operation of the punitive 
process. 
From the regulated party’s perspective, the advantage in signing a 
settlement is clear: there is no recognition of guilt nor is there wide exposure 
in the media or a possible future conviction that accompanies recognition 
of guilt. Such effects could cause an individual’s reputation to take a 
significant hit. On the other hand, in a settlement, the payment must be 
carried out in ten days, and there is no chance for appeal to the courts. 
From the enforcement system point of view, the punitive process is 
long and drawn out with uncertain results, while a settlement that includes 
a substantial cash payment that is swift and certain. The CVM’s decision to 
apply punitive measures can be revised by the CRSFN. This at the least 
would extend the date of a final decision. Even after the administrative 
appellate court decision, it is possible to challenge its legality in the 
judiciary. 
However, even before the final judgment, the path to a decision’s 
execution can be a long one. Even if the decision of the CVM, CRSFN, or 
judiciary is to pursue a punitive action, if there is no voluntary payment by 
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the defendant, the value of the penalty will be added to the rolling debt to 
be charged through the judgment of a compensation action. This part of the 
process does not occur at the CVM, it can take years for the process to be 
fully effective. 
In this context, having a consensual instrument that obliges the 
regulated party to pay in ten days has a certain value that the regulator 
understands to be significant and would not seem to be contrary to the 
punishment strategy. In contrast, the settlement and consent decree reveal 
themselves to be extremely effective instruments to manage the unlawful 
practices of the market, including insider trading. In addition, they represent 
an alternative to processes with instruction and instrument deficiencies and 
would allow for better human and financial resource allocation by the 
regulator.71 The legislation grants discretionary power for the regulator to 
choose which instruments to use based on opportunity, convenience, and 
grounds on public interest. Discretionary power is a valid pathway to give 
some sort of flexibility for the public administration.  
If only a comparison of the amounts proposed in the settlements is 
taken into account, it is not possible to understand the minimum parameters 
for using consent decrees and settlements that can compromise the 
regulator’s consistent action and, thus, its ability to achieve a deterrence 
goal. Other factors may explain the choice of whether or not to establish 
settlement agreements. But considering the lack of grounds for the decision, 
these other factors are not seen in empirical research based on the available 
documents. 
However, it was relevant to understand what these terms mean and 
concluded that vague terms such as “convenience” and “opportunity” often 
appeared in the arguments used to sustain acceptance of a consent decrees. 
This is a challenge that the CVM must address in a rational way: it should 
better substantiate its decisions. Effective communication keeps away any 
suspicions of privilege given to some but not others. This bears on the 
guarantee of legal security and sends a message to the market about how 
illicit activities are handled.  
 
C. Intra-Institutional Perspective 
 
Beyond the administrative sphere, the legal prohibition of insider 
trading can reach the criminal and civil spheres with the participation of the 
CVM, Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, and judiciary.  
 
 71. Kevin E. Davis, Maira Machado, Guilhermo Jorge. Coordination the 
enforcement of anti-corruption law: South American experiences, September, p. 7, 2014 
(forthcoming) 
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Even though Brazil has a dual enforcement model for punitive 
purposes, the criminal sphere seems very ineffective as suggested by the 
very low number of criminal cases compared to the administrative level. 
The data about the CVM’s punitive activity reveals that there are potential 
insider trading acts that should be in the criminal sphere but were punished 
at the administrative level instead. As discussed above, there are just two 
criminal decisions involving nine persons. There are, however, a few other 
cases with no judgment yet. 72 The nonuse of criminal consequences is not 
just a characteristic of the Brazilian enforcement system,73 but what feature 
of the Brazilian legal system could explain this result?  
In Brazil, at the criminal level, the main actor would necessarily be 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the only institution that has standing to file 
a criminal lawsuit before courts in cases of insider trading. Knowledge of 
the facts depends greatly, but not exclusively, on the CVM’s 
communication to the Public Prosecutors Office of its suspicions of use of 
nonpublic information. Our empirical research suggests that there is a 
stockpile of potential cases judged in the administrative sphere that should 
be analyzed in the criminal sphere, but criminal lawsuits seem not to have 
been filed.74 The next question is why does this happen? Unfortunately, it 
is not easy to determine this from official documents.  
In Brazil, according to the legality principle, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office has no discretion and is obligated to prosecute every criminal 
offence that comes to its attention or suggest to the judiciary a justified 
termination of the proceeding.75 If the criminal judge does not agree with 
the termination, the Head of the Public Prosecutors must decide whether to 
end the case, investigate further, or immediately file the law suit. All of 
 




d3&txtPalavraGerada=Gvaj&txtChave=&numPagina=0. ); MAEDA (T.R.F.-3. Ap. 
Crim. nº 0008358-25.2014.4.03.6181, São Paulo); KLABIN (T.R.F-3. Ap. Crim. nº 
0002511-03.2018.4.03.6181, São Paulo); OGX (Juízo Federal, 3ª Vara Criminal, Rio de 
Janeiro. Ação Penal nº 0029174- 94.2014.4.02.5101); JBS (Juízo Federal, 3ª Vara 
Criminal, Rio de Janeiro. Ação Penal nº 0006243-26.2017.403.6181) 
 73. For a comparative empirical finding regarding insider trading enforcement 
in Australia, Canada (Ontario), Hong Kong, Singapore, United Kingdom and United 
States, see: Lev Bromberg, George Gilligan, Ian Ramsay. The extent and intensity of 
insider trading enforcement – an international comparison, Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, vol. 17, n. 1, 2017, p. 73-110. 
 74. For data before 2008, see Eduardo Ribeiro Faria de Oliveira, Tiago Bottino, 
Seletividade do sistema penal dos crimes contra o mercado de capitais (Lei n. 6.385/76), 
available at http://www.conpedi.org.br/manaus/arquivos/anais/fortaleza/3244.pdf 
(showing that there is a selective criminal system for the capital markets crimes). 
 75. Art. 24 e 28, Brazilian Criminal Code. 
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these decisions must be transparent. According to the law, there is no space 
for unjustified decisions or a nontransparent system. The question that 
arises with regard to whether this divergence of numbers is a consequence 
of a communication problem with the CVM and the prosecutor or is linked 
to internal issues of the Public Prosecutor’s Office which could 
hypothetically argue that criminal issues related to the capital market are 
not on the Public Prosecutor’s agenda.  
As revealed by Davis, Machado, and Jorge “strict compliance with 
this principle is practically impossible.”76 The authors point out that the 
legality principle reduces discretionary powers, but does not totally 
eliminate them, while also potentially making it difficult to implement 
enforcement strategies.77 The impossibility of being accountable for 
enforcement strategies makes more difficult the task of understanding the 
ineffectiveness of the criminal consequences of insider trading and 
suggesting improvements.  
The first criminal case (Sadia/Perdigão) showed that the legal 
provision alone was insufficient to truly criminalize insider trading. It was 
first necessary to improve communication between the CVM and the Public 
Prosecutor through cooperative agreement. However, the information flow 
from the CVM to the Public Prosecutor is not publicly available. Nor, for 
that matter, are the criteria for the actions of the Public Prosecutor 
accessible from an analysis of the final results. 
The decision to give the Public Prosecutor jurisdiction, depending 
in certain ways on the CVM’s actions, reveals greater institutional 
complexity that impacts the achievement of the strategy. Communication 
is a precondition for institutions to work by exchanging information and 
having clarity about the role that each one plays in the institutional design. 
In the design that has been chosen, the administrative and criminal 
processes seem to be complementary, as they should be, acting 
collaboratively way so that the final result of the punishment message may 
be achieved.78 
In this relationship, it is necessary to consider the timing and 
strategy of the actions of both institutions. In addition, it should be 
questioned whether they should be working together or separately. In the 
available cases, their joint action appears in different forms. In the 
Sadia/Perdigão case, the criminal lawsuit came after the administrative 
decision and counted on a joint effort by the CVM and the Public 
Prosecutor. In two more recent cases (Mundial, OGX, and JBS) the criminal 
lawsuit began before the administrative action and in an independent form. 
 
 76. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014, p. 7. 
 77. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014, p. 7. 
 78. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014. 
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The goal here is not to attack the principle of independence between the 
two spheres, but to point out that closer collaboration or more independent 
action may impact the institutional design and the final result.  
Despite the fact that it seems that only time will tell what the best 
design is, this action may still be the object of better understanding and 
eventual improvement. It may also be possible for us to better understand 
the role of each level. As an exercise of comparison in studies on the 
enforcement system of anti-corruption laws in Brazil, the multi-institutional 
model79 or the modular institutional design is often deemed favorable to the 
punishment system. 80 
Based on the available information, it can be established that a pre-
condition of good communication of penalization is the existence of a flow 
of information along with transparency in the act of communicating. In 
effect, there must be systemic control and, more importantly, effective 
communication relating to the punishment strategy.  
 
D. Civil Liability Sphere 
 
The least effective of all the tools are direct suits by investors under 
the Corporation Law or general principles of civil liability. We located just 
one case81 over a period of 10 years, but none with a final decision.  
Despite the fact that it is almost impossible to specify the victims of 
insider trading and sue for compensation, the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and CVM filed two lawsuits jointly seeking compensation for losses caused 
to the market.82 The cases ended with a consent decree that ordered the 
payment of three times the gained value to the CVM and Fund for Defense 
of Diffuse Interests, without any benefits to investors or Brazilian capital 
markets. The agreement also prohibited the defendant from holding the 
position of public listed companies or intermediaries in the capital market 
for three years.  
It is questionable whether this compensation instrument, processed 
through a trial of public civil action, is necessary. In the context of the 
enforcement system and the deterrence strategy, it is difficult to access the 
real function of this action.  
 
 79. Mariana Mota Prado, Lindsey Carson. Brazilian anti-corruption legislation 
and its enforcement: potential lessons for institutional design, IRIBA Working paper 09, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497936. 
 80. Davis, Machado and Jorge, 2014, p. 2. 
 81. T.J.R.T. Ap. Civ. 0085670-76.2015.8.19.0001, Rio de Janeiro, Relatora: 
Des. Valéria Dacheux Nascimento, 25.06.2019, decision available at: 
http://www1.tjrj.jus.br/gedcacheweb/default.aspx?UZIP=1&GEDID=0004B9DA6837C
DA16F05729C2BE2EE95F687C50A3E1F535E 
 82. See note 68 and 70 supra. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Brazilian legal system has rules that forbid the use of nonpublic 
information and provides sanctions through the administrative and criminal 
punishment systems, in addition to creating civil liabilities. The data 
presented suggests that the rule is enforced.  
However, an overview of institutional design and its various 
instruments reveals the complexity of the system and sheds light on the 
importance of understanding the alternative legal tools available to 
institutions, as well as the coordination, competition, or conflict among the 
institutions responsible for enforcement of insider trading laws.  
The main empirical finding is that Brazil is actively enforcing its 
insider trading laws, and this undoubtedly is having a deterrent effect. 
However, we have observed that the existing cases reached different 
outcomes depending on which regulatory instruments were applied and 
which institutions had been proactive in verifying the illicit activity. While 
there may be benefits from this multi-institutional model, the existence of 
a diversity of results may affect the deterrent effect of enforcement.  
